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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
Nature of the Case 
The matter presently before this Appellate Court of the State of Idaho concerns the 
Memorandum Decision issued September 24, 2008, by the District Court, Senior District 
Judge D. Duff McKee, presiding, that affllllled the suspension Order rendered by the 
Department of Transportation, Administrative Hearing Examiner, Michael B. Howell, 
resulting in the suspension of Petitioner-Appellant's driving privileges, pursuant to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found and entered by the Hearing Officer on 
December 14, 2007 (Ad. R, p. 21-23). 
Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review was filed with the District Court to review 
the Agency's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order entered by that Hearing 
Examiner, and by that process, to preserve Mr. Wheeler's right of appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court on those issues of concern relating to the wrongful suspension of Licensee's 
driving privileges and right to operate a motor vehicle under Idaho law. The substance of 
this Appeal concerns the factual findings and conclusions made by the Hearing Officer, 
leading to the Decision suspending the driver's license of Mr. Wheeler on December 14, 
2007, which sustained the proposed suspension set forth in the Notice of Suspension (Ad. R, 
p. 1 (Exhibit # 1 ), with a resulting permanent impact to the license status and history of 
Petitioner-Appellant with the Idaho Department of Transportation. 
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II. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Mr. Wheeler was issued a Notice of Suspension on November 3, 2007, at which 
time his driver's license was seized from his possession by the arresting officer, and Mr. 
Wheeler was issued a Temporary Driving Permit pursuant to that Notice of Suspension. The 
Boise City Officer, M. Ruffalo, arrested Mr. Wheeler for the alleged offense of DUI, but 
admittedly had never once observed the actual operation of the vehicle (Ad. R, p.3). 
Arguably, Mr. Wheeler may have been observed as the operator of a motor vehicle by a 
different Boise City Officer, Officer Robinson, (Ad. R, p.3), but we have no affidavit or any 
sworn statements from Officer Robinson at any time in the Record of this Administrative 
Proceeding to provide for credible and admissible evidence for purposes of accomplishing 
the necessary compliance with Due Process of law prior to taking a constitutionally 
protected property right. 
Pursuant to § 18-8002 (a), Idaho Code, Mr. Wheeler inunediately requested the 
Department of Transportation schedule an administrative hearing on the issue of the 
proposed suspension of his driver's license and operating privileges (Ad. R, p. 8-11), as Mr. 
Wheeler challenged the issue of probable cause and the presence of any reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to support any legal cause for the stop, and furthermore articulated his 
challenge to the reliability and credibility of the test results. The hearing was initially set for 
a telephone conference, under the authority of § 18-8002, Idaho Code, scheduled before the 
Department's authorized Hearing Examiner, for November 28, 2007, at 11:30 a.m. This 
Hearing was changed because of a schedule conflict (Ad. R, p. 16-17), and (Ad. R, p. 20), 
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and the Hearing was then re-scheduled to December 6, 2007, at 4:00 p.m. (Ad. R, p. 19); 
(see also T. p.3). 
The matter came on for that telephone hearing scheduled for December 6, 2007, 
(though the Record will show the Hearing Officer's Order has incorrectly identified the 
Hearing date in the Order, (Ad. R, p. 21). 
At this hearing, held on December 6, 2007, Mr. Wheeler argued the actual 
proceeding should be conducted at an on-site in person hearing, rather than a telephone 
setting, and stated: 
MR. SMITH: "I would have -- let me first begin at this time to say that I have a 
reservation and an objection in that we are currently scheduled for a telephonic hearing, and 
it would appear from my understanding of the evidence we would have to present there 
would be an issue of credibility raised by Mr. Wheeler in his testimony challenging the 
connotation of what purportedly Officer Robinson claims to have seen regarding a failure to 
maintain a lane. And it's further complicated by the fact that Officer Ruffalo is the only 
individual who has filed a Probable Cause Affidavit, and in there he states that he did not 
witness any crime being committed in his presence and rather indicates the information, if . 
any, he received came from Officer Robinson who has not filed any Probable Cause 
Affidavit. Therefore, we have no sworn testimony relative to the issue of probable cause and 
the testimony that will be given from Mr. Wheeler will be in the nature and in the context of 
challenging the hearsay statement contained in the Probable Cause Affidavit. 
Consequently, it is going to raise an issue of credibility. My concern then is that we 
may fall squarely within the mandates of the recent Decision determined by Judge D. Duff 
McKee back on August 18, 2005, in the matter of Furtado versus ITD, Case No. 
CV000407007D, wherein Judge McKee then held that when issues of credibility are raised 
and a Hearing Officer must render a Decision based upon those elements of credibility, it is 
not appropriate to proceed with a telephonic, but rather must have an onsite, in-person 
hearing where observations can be made of those functional facets of credibility that can 
come only from observation as opposed through the telephone. So that's my first concern: 
And, secondly, another issue I have raised or would be raising here is that the test 
results produced as an element of evidence in this case indicate that the lot-solution used, the 
number of tests conducted from that lot solution relative to this defendant, Mr. David 
Wheeler, was number 117, and the policy and procedure or practice requirements for this 
particular type oflntoxilyzer Alcohol Analyzer, Permit Serial No. 66-004835, would require 
that the solution be changed every 30 days or every I 00 tests, whichever comes first; and it 
would appear here 117 is far after the 100, and, therefore, we question its admissibility 
because we would challenge reliability in light of the standard practice and procedures 
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adopted by the Department of Health and Welfare and by the Department of Law 
Enforcement. 
So those are the two matters of concern, and so it might be appropriate to address 
those, if, in fact, we should consider an onsite, in-person hearing first as opposed to 
proceeding with a telephonic hearing, because I don't want to have to repeat this process 
later if at all possible." (T. p.5-7). 
This hearing went forward, over Petitioner-Appellant's objection, and no 
live sworn testimony was produced by either Officer Ruffalo or Officer Robinson, to create 
a record of adequate probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the stop, and with the 
admission of the Breath Test "print-out", Exhibit 2, the record demonstrated the failure of 
the State to maintain and operate the machine to meet the requirements of the solution to 
assure credibility and reliability of the test results for use in these proceedings. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision were then entered 
December 14, 2007 (Ad. R, p. 21-24) from which a Petition for Judicial Review was filed 
with the District Court. On September 24, 2008, the District Court, Honorable D. Duff 
McKee presiding Senior District Judge, issued his Memorandum Decision, (R. p.27), 
affirming the license suspension. On the issue of probable cause presented by an officer who 
did not observe any operation of the motor vehicle, the District Court ruled: 
This is an administrative hearing, and is not governed by the formal rules of 
evidence. That the affidavit was based in part on the recital of another officer is not, in 
and of itself, a fatal defect. In administrative proceedings, that the administrative affidavit 
is compiled from the observations of several officers on the scene does not invalidate the 
affidavit on that basis alone. Wheeler has not shown any material defect in the affidavit 
or in the recital of facts contained therein, other than the subjective contradiction offered 
by Wheeler himself to the conclusions stated. This is not sufficient to defeat consideration of 
the affidavit. The hearing officer explained the weight he was giving to it and why; and 
there is no basis to overturn his findings in this area. I conclude that the evidence was more 
than sufficient to support the hearing officer's findings in this case. (R. p.30). 
On the issue of the BAC test results, and non-compliance with the calibration check 
and operating procedures, the District Court ruled: 
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Wheeler objects to the BAC test results arguing that because the calibration check 
solution was too old, the tests were not usable. According to the operating procedures, the 
calibrating solution should be changed after approximately every 100 calibration checks, 
or every 30 days, whichever is sooner. In this case, the calibration check in this case was 
within 30 days but was the 117th calibration check since the solution had been changed. 
The hearing officer concluded that the "should" in the operating procedure did not mean 
"shall"- that the term was a recommendation, not a mandatory requirement. Further, the 
procedure provides that the change of solution should be after "approximately" every 100 
checks, which indicates that the 100th check is not necessarily a bright-line boundary. 
Finally, I note that the tests results here were substantially over twice the legal limit. While 
the calibration check might be more critical if it was a close call, here, the tested levels were 
so far over the legal limit that the degree of precision in the fmal result is not material. I fmd 
no basis to disturb the hearing officer's conclusions at this point. (R. p.30-31 ). 
Statement of Facts at Hearing 
The only witness who testified before the Hearing Examiner was Mr. Wheeler, 
appearing and testifying in behalf of himself, as the Licensee. The officer who purportedly 
made the observation of driving, and the officer needed to establish any legal basis for the 
stop, neither testified nor submitted any affidavit. Mr. Wheeler testified, as identified in the 
Administrative transcript, (T. p. 8-13), confirming the fact he, at aH times, maintained his 
lane of travel, and there was never any reasonable, articulable suspicion, or probable cause 
existing to stop him for the encounter, resulting detention, and subsequent arrest. The 
hearing examiner was presented with only a Probable Cause Affidavit of Officer Ruffalo, 
who confirmed in his Probable Cause Affidavit he never witnessed any driving pattern, and 
admittedly expressed in the affidavit the fact no crime was ever committed in his presence. 
That document was admitted under the hearing regulations as Exhibit #3 in the proceedings 
(Ad. R p. 3). 
The Probable Cause Affidavit, being a hearsay document in itself, is not 
subject to cross-examination, and that hearsay document served only to contain further 
hearsay within it that presented statements that were taken from unsworn testimony, and that 
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affidavit became the only basis for any finding Mr. Wheeler was the operator of the vehicle. 
That document did not provide any form of admissible evidence, or demonstrate Mr. 
Wheeler was lawfully stopped and detained for a valid claim of a traffic regulation. 
The Administrative Record (Exhibit 2), contained the print out from the BAC 
evidentiary test results, demonstrating the test performed on Mr. Wheeler was number 117 
test result for that Lot Solution. (Ad. R., p.2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. 
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT'S HEARING 
OFF1CER TO SUSPEND PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE 
WAS ERRONEOUS IN VIEW OF THE RECORD; IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, 
AND/OR EXCEEDS AGENCY AUTHORITY, MADE UPON UNLAWFUL 
PROCEDURE OF SPECULATION, PRESUMPTION, UNSWORN TESTIMONY, 
HEARSAY UPON HEARSAY, UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, 
COMPETENT, AND ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN 
ERROR IN FACT AND LAW. 
II. 
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE 
OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE FORTHE STOP ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT AND ADMISSABLE 
EVIDENCE. 
III. 
WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO A 
TELEPHONE HEARING SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUSTAINED, AND A LIVE 
TESTIMONY HEARING SCHEDULED TO ALLOW FOR THE STATE TO 
PRESENT ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
IV. 
WHETHER THE TEST RESULTS OF THE INTOX 5000 PRESENTED IN 
THIS ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING (EXHIBIT 2) CAN BE CONSIDERED 
CREDIBLE, RELIABLE, AND ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE, OR A VIOLATION OF 
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THE OPEERA TION PROCEDURES FOR LICENSE SUSPENSION PURPOSES 
UNDER IDAHO LAW. 
V. 
WHETHER APPELLANT-PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Department of Transportation is an agency subject to administrative 
review. See In Re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 656, 99 P.3d 125 (App 2004); see Archer v. State, 
145 Idaho 617, 181 P. 3d, 543(App. 2008), see also§ 67-5201 (2), Idaho Code. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See§§ 49°201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270, Idaho Code. In an appeal 
from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this 
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. See Knight 
v. Dep't of Ins., 124 Idaho 645,862, P. 2d 337 (App. 1993); see Marshall v. Idaho Dep't 
. ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 339(App. 2002); see Archer v. State, supra. 
This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. § 67-5279(1), Idaho Code; see Marshall, supra. This 
Court defers to the agency's fmdings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda 
v. Brighton Corp .. 130 Idaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); see Marshall, supra, 
see Archer v. State, supra. 
The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex 
. . 
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rel. Bd. of Comm's, 134 Idaho 353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); see Marshall v. Idaho 
Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669; see In Re Mahurin; see also Archer v. 
State, supra. 
An Administrative Hearing Officer's decision is subject to challenge tlrrough a 
Petition for Judicial Review. See § 18-8002 A (8), Idaho Code; see Kane v. State, Dep't of 
Transp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (App. 2003); see In Re Mahurin, supr<!, 140 
Idaho 656, 99 P. 3d 125 (App.2004). 
Upon review, the court will overturn an agency's decision where the hearing 
officer's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions: 
(a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) exceed statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or 
( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
See § 67-5279(3), Idaho Code; see In Re Mahurin, supra; see also Archer v. State; supra. 
The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency 
erred in a manner specified in§ 67-5279(3), Idaho Code, and that a substantial right of 
that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 
Idaho 429, 958 P.2d 583, (1998); see Marshall v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 
48 P.3d 666, see also Archer v. State, supra. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on 
appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." § 
67-5279(3), Idaho Code. 
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The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See§ 67-5279(1), Idaho Code. 
The Administrative Code, established in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, does 
address the hearing proceedings and agency relief in administrative proceedings, which 
therein provides for an aggrieved person to seek judicial review of any act, order or 
proceeding c,f an agency. See § 67-5270, Idaho Code. ln such a proceeding for judicial 
review, the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IAP A) and its standard of review would 
ill2Jlli'.. 
The Court exercises free review over all questions of law and any legal conclusions 
reached by the agency. See Qualman v. State Department of Employment, 129 Idaho 92, 
922 P.2d 389 (1996); see Crooks v. lnland 465 Ltd. Partnership. 129 Idaho 43, 921 P.2d 743 
(1996). 
Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal. See 
Peterson v. Franklin County. supra; Love v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bingham 
County, 105 Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 417 (1983); Von Jones v. Board of County Com'rs, Cassia 
County, 129 Idaho 683 931 P.2d 1201 (1997); Greenfield Village Apts. v. Ada County, 130 
Idaho 207, 938 P. 2d 1245 (1997). 
A decision cannot rest on speculation or conjecture. Peterson v. Pany, 92 Idaho 
647,652,448 P.2d 653,658 (1968); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46,844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON ISSUES I, II, & III, RAISED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE I. 
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT'S HEARING 
OFFICER TO SUSPEND PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE 
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WAS ERRONEOUS IN VIEW OF THE RECORD; IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, 
AND/OR EXCEEDS AGENCY AUTHORITY, MADE UPON UNLAWFUL 
PROCEDURE OF SPECULATION, PRESUMPTION, UNSWORN TESTIMONY, 
HEARSAY UPON HEARSAY, UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, 
COMPETENT, AND ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN 
ERROR IN FACT AND LAW. 
ISSUE II. 
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO THE 
OPERATION OF THE VEIDCLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE STOP ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT AND ADMISSABLE 
EVIDENCE. 
ISSUE III. 
WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO A 
TELEPHONE HEARING SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUSTAINED, AND A LIVE 
TESTIMONY HEARING SCHEDULED TO ALLOW FOR THE STATE TO· 
PRESENT ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
In an Administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove the 
grounds to vacate the suspension. See § 18-8002A (7), Idaho Code; see also Kane v. State, 
Dep't ofTransp .. 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P. 3d 130,134 (app. 2003); see In re Mahurin, 140 
Idaho 656,658, 99 P. 3d 125, 127 (App. 2004); see Archer v. State, 145 Idaho 617, 181 P. 
3d 543 (App. 2008). The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the driver has shown one of the several grounds enumerated 
in § 18-8002A (7), Idaho Code, for vacating the suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or was in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004(c) or 18-
8006, Idaho Code; or 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004( c) or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered 
at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance with the requirements 
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of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly 
when the test was administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as 
required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The fundamental questions raised in these issues on appeal from this administrative 
proceeding is whether the Agency Record has established, by substantial and competent 
evidence, the presence of probable cause §18-8002 A (7) (a), Idaho Code, to conclude Mr. 
Wheeler failed to maintain his lane of travel, giving rise to a basis to stop and detain him. 
The testimony of Mr. Wheeler said no, and the absence of testimony from Officer Ruffalo 
has confirmed he did not have any personal observation of a driving pattern. The hearsay 
reference to what Officer Ruffalo said he was by Officer Robinson was an unsworn . 
comment and not subject to cross-examination, a critical element of a constitutional right, 
( 6th Amendment), when your constitutionally protected property right being , and it cannot 
be infringed upon, except through Due Process of law, being the presence of both 
substantive and procedural due process of law. When the Department was faced with the 
specific objection for going forward with a hearing because of only hearsay contained 
within a hearsay document of the officer, after demonstrating no observation was made by 
Officer Ruffalo who alone submitted the affidavit, the proceeding should have been vacated 
to avoid the rendition of this inadequate record. Essentially, the Hearing Officer chose to 
accept a hearsay affidavit of Officer Ruffalo, declined the opportunity to recess the hearing. 
to allow for live testimony of Officer Robinson who might be able, or willing, to claim to 
have been an eye witness to a driving pattern, to afford the licensee a right to cross 
examination in accordance with the provisions of the 6th Amendment, which could establish 
a complete record. The Hearing Officer chose to go forward with the telephone hearing, and 
merely assume there was a lawful basis for the stop, based only upon the hearsay contained 
. . 
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from Officer Robinson's comment, contained in the affidavit of Officer Ruffalo, despite the 
fact the record is void of testimony to support a probable cause basis. Officer Ruffalo's 
affidavit confirmed he saw no operation of the vehicle at any time, and offered the comment 
to the effect Officer Robinson claimed to see the lane change, thereby constituting a 
production of hearsay within the hearsay document. Tue Hearing Officer's ruling there is no 
"lack of credibility", appears to be an illogical, speculative, and conclusory reasoning, as 
that was also based on the circular reasoning the Intox test results was ruled as being 
reliable, and that overcomes the potential of a conflict in credibility. Tue test results should 
not by used as a substitute for the state's obligation to have probable cause for the stop, and 
especially so when the licensee demonstrates there exists no probable cause for the stop, and 
the test was procedurally non-compliant on its face. 
The way the Hearing Officer elected to dispense with this objection to the 
presentation of evidence by way of "hearsay on hearsay" in order to artificially create an 
observation, was to determine: 
"The driver argued that the hearing should be in person because there were 
issues of credibility of the witnesses which could only be determined by an in person 
hearing where the hearing examiner could observe the witnesses. However, no witnesses 
were called and the driver was the only one to testify. Tue only conflict was he stated he did 
not weave out of his lane or break any traffic laws and officer gave his grounds for stopping 
him as his failing to maintain his lane. There is no issue of credibility since the breath test 
showed that the driver was over twice the legal limit and likely not aware that he was 
weaving out ofhis lane of traffic, making the testimony of the officer more credible without 
having to observe the demeanor of the witness." (Ad. R, p. 21-22) (Emphasis added). 
Tue Hearing Officer elected to substitute the absence of probable cause for the stop 
by using the challenged and unreliable test results to bolster and sustain the unjustified stop. 
You cannot get to a test, or its results, until you demonstrate the presence of probable cause 
actually dic;l exist as a basis for the stop. There was no admissible "t.estimony of the officer'' 
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to allow for a conclusion that probable cause existed, and there was no basis to say the 
officer was more credible without having to observe the demeanor of the witness, when no 
such admissible evidence was in the affidavit to get to an issue of credibility. Officer 
Robinson chose not to testify, and did not give any sworn statement, and Officer Ruffalo 
made no observation of any driving pattern. This misplaced reasoning constitutes an 
arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion, and is wrong from the inception. 
There is no basis for the Hearing Officer to conclude Mr. Wheeler failed to maintain 
his lane of travel by relying upon what is not in the Record, and not offered as admissible 
evidence. The Hearing Officer has no authority or basis to speculate, presume or assume 
facts not in evidence, and should not be allowed to give credible reliance to an unsworn 
statement of another Officer who could have produced a sworn statement or testified. It 
constitutes hearsay upon hearsay, and goes so far in relaxing the procedural requirements 
under the Due Process Clause required to protect a property right. This "credibility" 
assessment by the Hearing Officer over non-existent testimony that includes speculation, 
presumption, and assumption of what was not properly made part of the Record is nothing 
less than an arbitrary and erroneous finding, in view of the actual live testimony of Mr. 
Wheeler, and the limited value of the probable cause affidavit presented by Officer Ruffalo 
precludes such speculation about what was never said under oath, let alone not presented 
properly by a valid affidavit, and must be seen to result in the capricious conclusion and 
abuse of discretion of the agency in evaluating what constitutes credible sworn testimony. 
Mr. Wheeler has shown the affidavit, Exhibit 2, is void of any admissible or credible 
observation of a requisite driving pattern, and raised the challenge to the presentation of 
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evidence by the form of unswom hearsay in a hearsay document, and did insist upon live 
testimony, because of the potential of this credibility issue. 
Consequently, and unfortunately, the Hearing Officer chose to accept the inadequate 
affidavit of Officer Ruffalo, and exclude the credible testimony of Mr. Wheeler, by 
accepting unswom statements contained in a hearsay document over the testimony given 
under oath by Mr. Wheeler in the proceeding. 
Toe determination of any issue of credibility is a matter to be considered by the trier 
of fact, but to be considered, it must be exercised in the elements essential for its intelligent 
analysis. A trier of fact's determination will not be disturbed except for manifest abuse, and 
to deny the needed elements to exercise such an analysis would seem to be an abuse in itself. 
Toe circumstance here is an abuse of discretion warranting reversal because the logic used 
to fmd probable cause and deny the need to address the elements of credibility is flawed and 
entirely misplaced, as the Hearing Officer chose instead to focus on an incompetent and 
unreliable test results for. a supporting basis to assume alcohol presence impaired Mr: 
Wheeler's ability to remember he failed to maintain his lane, despite the lack of probable 
cause presented for the stop, and that circular reasoning itself is questionable, and serves to 
set up an even greater abuse of discretion in the analysis of these elements in this dispute. 
Toe Hearing Officer erred in attempting to resolve the credible evidence issue by 
concluding the evidence could not be in conflict because of the misplaced reliance on an 
incompetent test result that violates the BAC operating procedures on its face. Without the 
personal involvement of the "observing" officer with his presentation of a sworn statement, 
or his live testimony, the licensee is denied his substantive and procedural due process rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, and any doctrine of fundamental 
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fairness required by constitutional law is eliminated in the process. Toe need for protection 
of a person's property rights (driver's license) is at issue, and at a minimum should require 
substantial and competent evidence to be presented in a due process forum of any 
administrative hearing. A driver's license is a property right protected under the United 
States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, as announced in Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 
Idaho 99, 101,416 P. 2d 4648(1966); see also Arrow Transportation Co. v. IPVC, 85 Idaho 
307,379, P.2d 422 (1963); see State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938). 
Should it ever get to the need for a determination of credibility, even on a complete 
record, it becomes a complex process, requiring evaluation of multiple factors, but before 
you can even get there to evaluate the factors, you must have a fact in dispute created from 
admissible evidence, and this process of allowing hearsay on top of a hearsay document, 
attempting to simplify the complexity of an Administrative Hearing Process, appears to be 
going too far in the eyes of a logical application of the Due Process Clause. Toe very idea 
of cross-examination is· a critical component in the evaluation of a witnesses' veracity, and 
that in itself is an element comprised within and protected under the 6th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and a fundamental part of the due process of law under the I 4th 
Amendment criteria. There can be no fundamental due process if you cannot allow a 
procedural right of confrontation because you are not allowed to have witness testimony to 
cross-examine, as contemplated under the 6th Amendment. Toe record becomes flawed 
when the situation is thus compounded when you are left with the comparison between a 
"live" testimony (l\ifr. Wheeler) under oath, witness and a hearsay document that contains 
unswom hearsay, and neither the affiant nor the hearsay source is made available for cross-
examination. 
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Where the circumstances of an administrative proceeding require a Hearing Officer 
to dete1IDine the fundamental issue of veracity of what is a non-existent witness, it is 
arbitrary for the Hearing Officer to rule against a testifying witness, and rule in favor of 
what is absent. It becomes capricious to make a decision on "credibility" and "probable 
cause" without the need to have facts in dispute, presented from an admissible source. 
Where issues of credibility are being created, which here was an attempt to present 
hearsay of Officer Robinson with his unswom comment to Officer Ruffalo, through a 
hearsay document, it becomes arbitrary, if not capricious, and is reversible error, and cannot 
fo1ID the basis to take a property right when their sole affidavit is lacking the requisite · 
probable cause expected and required under Idaho law to be provided. 
The Hearing Officer would have better served this process had he elected to 
conclude a telephone hearing would not be sufficient, as the record was void of any lawful 
· basis for a stop, and it would better serve the mandates of the Due Process clause to reset 
that matter to a titne where all parties, including the arresting and claitned observing officer, 
could be present to offer their testitnony in the presence of the Hearing Officer, as was 
requested by Petitioner-Appellant. At a minitnum, to properly exercise a discretion upon a 
factual record, the Hearing Officer should have recessed the hearing to a titne when the 
officer claitning to have made an observation could be made available to participate, either 
in person, by telephone, or upon presentation of a sworn statement to explain his claitn of 
what is being said by way of a driving pattern. The suspension order, finding the existence 
of probable cause for the stop, and any issues on credibility, must be vacated and set aside 
by virtue of§ 18-8002 A(7)(a), Idaho Code. 
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ISSUE IV. 
WHETHER THE TEST RESULTS OF THE INTOX 5000 PRESENTED IN THIS 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING (EXHIBIT 2) CAN BE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE, 
RELIABLE, AND ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE, OR A VIOLATION OF THE 
OPEERATION PROCEDURES FOR LICENSE SUSPENSION PURPOSES UNDER 
IDAHOLAW. 
Tue Hearing Officer held in his Order: "There is no issue of credibility since the 
breath test showed that the driver was over twice the legal limit and likely not aware that he 
was weaving out of his lane of traffic, making the testimony of the officer more credible 
without having to observe the demeanor of the witnesses." (CL R., p. 21-22). (Emphasis 
added). 
With all due respect to Mr. Howell, this appears to be a fallacy of logic, in that it 
assumes the breath test mechanism had produced an admissible test result, when the 
operating procedures of this machine, as promulgated by the Idaho Department of Law 
Enforcement (IDLE), and the Idaho State Police(ISP) have declared they must frrst meet the 
procedural requirements for the use of the machine, and before any reliance can be placed 
on any such test results, from the machine must have first procedurally complied with the 
mandate the Lot Solution used must be changed (approximately) every 100 tests, or every 
30 days, whichever is sooner. Despite the procedural operations requirement, the hearing 
Officer went on to say: 
"The driver argued that the breath test should be dismissed for failure to observe 
the standard operating procedures for the operation of the Intoxylizer 5000 had not been 
followed because the calibration check solution had been used 117 times. The standard 
operating procedures for the operation of the Intoxylizer 5000 state, "Solutions should be 
changed approximately every 100 calibration checks ... " (Emphasis added.) Should is a 
recommendation and not a mandatory requirement. Furthermore, the term "approximately" 
is never defmed, leaving the suggested times subject to broad interpretation. Using the same 
solution for 117 checks does not invalidate the results of the subject test." (Ad.R. p.22). 
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As stated above, a Hearing Officer's decision may not be upheld if, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the driver has shown one of the several grounds enumerated 
in § 18-8002 A(7) exists for vacating the suspension. As stated above, those grounds 
include: 
( d) The tests for alcohol· concentration, drugs, or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace were not conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of§ 18-8004 A (4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning 
properly when the test was administered ... § 18-8002 A (7)( d); Idaho Code; see also In Re 
Mahnrin, 140 Idaho 656,658,99 P.3d, 125,127 (App. 2004), see also Archer v. State, 145 
Idaho 617, 181 P. 3d 543 (App. 2008). 
One critical issue of Mr. Wheeler's appeal concerns the fact the Intoxilyzer 
5000 machine used for his test samples had a solution in it that was not maintained and 
calibrated properly in compliance with applicable standards for the operation of the 
equipment. 
§ 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code provides for the tests to determine alcohol 
· concentration of blood, urine or breath, and that statute mandates it must be performed in 
facilities and by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and must be in compliance 
with standards set by the State Police. To carry out the authority conferred by that statute, 
the Idaho State Police issued operating manuals, establishing procedures for the 
maintenance and operation of the breath testing equipment, including the Intoxilyzer 
5000. See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01.013.03. Noncompliance with 
these procedures would be one of the grounds for vacating an administrative license 
suspension as identified in § l 8-8002A (7) ( d), Idaho Code. See In re Mahurin, supra at 
Idaho 659-660; see also Archer v. State, supra. 
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The manual for the Intoxilyzer 5000 states the following, concerning solutions 
to be used for calibration checks of the equipment: 
An Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration check consists of using a wet-bath simulator 
to analyze solutions supplied by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
or an approved vendor. Calibration check solutions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date as marked on the label. Solutions should only be used as long as values 
produced are within the designated acceptable range. Solutions should be changed 
approximately every 100 calibration checks or every month whichever comes 
first. (Standard Operating Procedure, Breath Alcohol Testing, Pg. II-2 ( emphasis added). 
See In Re Mahurin, supra. 
This "calibration check solution" of testing machines became an issue in the In 
Re Mahurin matter (supra). It addressed an issue only with reference to the 30 day aspect 
of the procedure, where it says: "solutions should be changes approximately every 100 
calibration checks, or every month, whichever comes first". In Mahurin, supra, the Court 
said: 
"Next, we address Mahurin's contention that the maintenance logs that were 
produced and placed in evidence showed that the calibration check solution for 
the Intoxilyzer 5000 had not been changed within the preceding month as 
prescribed in the manual. According to Mahurin, the directive in the Intoxilyzer 
5000 manual that "solutions should be changed approximately every 100 
calibration checks or every month whichever comes first," creates a strict 
requirement that solutions be changed no Jess than every thirty days. The hearing 
officer concluded that the language relied upon by Mahurin was recommendatory, 
not mandatory, and inferred that a solution change occurred on May 30 when the 
equipment was placed in service. On appeal, Mahurin contends that the hearing 
officer's interpretation of the manual was incorrect and that the inference drawn 
by the hearing officer is unsupported by the evidence. 
We need not decide the merit of either ofMahurin's contentions because on the 
record presented, Mahurin failed to meet his burden to prove that the calibration 
check solution was not changed when the equipment was placed back in service 
on May 30. (Emphasis added). 
Mahurin's argumentis predicated on a misperception that the ITD bore the burden 
of proof at the hearing to show that the equipment was properly calibrated and 
maintained. To the contrary, as noted above, the person requesting a hearing on a 
license suspension bears the burden under J.C. § l 8-8002A(7)( d) to prove one of 
the enumerated grounds to vacate the suspension. Hence, if the evidentiary record 
is insufficient to establish whether the solution was changed on May 30, it is 
Mahurin, not the ITD, who failed in the burden of proof. Here, the machine was 
placed in service thirty-one days prior to Mahurin's test, and there is ambiguity as 
to whether the solution was changed on that date. As previously noted, Mahurin 
. . 
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did not subpoena a witness to testify about the procedures conducted on May 30. 
Because Mahurin presented no affirmative evidence showing that 
the calibration check solution had not been changed within one month before his 
June 30 test, any error in the hearing officer's finding or in his interpretation of the 
manual was harmless." (Emphasis added). 
The situation presented in Archer v. State, supra, was somewhat different, as it 
addressed the Alco-Sensor III machine, instead of the Intoxilyzer 5000. However, that 
court said: 
Archer argues that, because a calibration record was not attached to his subject 
test, his test was not conducted in accordance with the methods approved by the 
ISP. Specifically, Archer contends that, because§ 18-8004(4), Idaho Code 
requires that "analysis of ... breath for the purpose of determining alcohol 
concentration shall be performed ... by any ... method approved by the Idaho 
state police" and because the ISP has issued materials stating that a calibration test 
needs to be attached to a subject test, the district court was correct in vacating his 
license suspension pursuant to § 18-8002A(7)( d), Idaho Code. 
To the extent that Archer is arguing that a calibration check was not performed 
within twenty-four hours of his breath test on the Alco-Sensor III, again his 
argument fails. Much like the drivers in Mahurin and Kane, Archer presented no 
evidence demonstrating that a calibration check had not been performed or that 
the machine was not operating correctly. Archer bore the burden of proof at the . 
ALS hearing and, because he produced no evidence regarding the lack of a 
calibration check or the reliability of the Alco-Sensor III, he failed to meet his 
burden of proof. (Emphasis added). 
The district court reversed the hearing officer's decision because it concluded 
that Archer was arguing that, by not attaching the calibration record, the "tests for 
alcohol concentration ... administered at the direction of the peace officer were 
not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho 
Code. 
Both of these cases were rendered by the Idaho Court of Appeals, and they hold 
for the proposition that: 
If an evidentiary hearing record is insufficient to establish whether the 
calibration check solution was changed as required for a subject test-a directive 
contained in the lntoxilyzer 5000 operation manual-it is the driver, not the ITD, 
who has failed to meet the burden of proof, see In re Mahurin, supra; see Archer 
v. State, supra. 
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Mr. Wheeler unconditionally met his burden of proof required by§ 18-8002A 
(7) ( d), Idaho Code, because there is a sufficient record to establish the fact the solution 
was not changed as required. The Hearing Officer so found it was the 117th test result, but 
notwithstanding that finding of fact, he made the arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
law conclusion that it did not invalidate the test results and elected to suspend the license. 
Exhibit 2 is the test results, and is the relevant documentthat demonstrated the fact the 
procedural and operational requirements were not met, and the test samples are non-
compliant by the contents of the very exhibit itself (Exhibit 2) as it confirmed Mr. 
Wheeler's breath test samples were calibration test number 117, thereby proving "by the 
evidentiary record", and "by a preponderance of the evidence", that the calibration check 
solution used in the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine for him had gone beyond the approximate 
"100 calibration checks", and in fact went 17% beyond the required use of that Lot 
solution, and consequently Mr. Wheeler did prove, beyond reasonable doubt, by the 
exhibit and the introduced evidence itself, that the Breath Testing equipment was not 
properly calibrated and maintained as required by Idaho Statute, and the promulgated 
rules of IDLE and ISP. This evidentiary record is sufficient to establish the solution was 
not changed at approximately 100 calibration checks, because it conclusively 
demonstrates it states it was number 117, and was not changed as was required under the 
operating procedures. 
In response to that undisputed fact, regarding the evidence of the calibration 
check test munber 117, the Hearing Officer simply elected to conclude: 
"[the use of the word] should is a recommendation and not a mandatory 
requirement. Furthermore, the term "approximately" is never defined, leaving the 
suggested times subject to broad interpretation." (Ad.R. p.22; Par VI). 
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That's an interesting comment by a hearing officer, and is precisely what we 
find the hearing Officer said in that order that gave rise to In Re Mahurin, supra, as the 
officer there explained the 30 day requirement was perceived by him to be only 
recommendatory, not mandatory. The Court of Appeals did not address that aspect of the 
agency fmding, but it may become necessary to do so here, as Appellant would argue that 
aspect is part of the rule and procedure being subject to the appeal here. That choice of 
calling it recommendatory only may constitute an abuse of discretion as the agency is 
attempting to interpret the Rules in a way contrary to the Doctrine of Lenity. 
Under the Rule ofLenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of 
the accused. State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1993). The same 
principles of construction that apply to criminal statutes apply also to rules and 
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies. See Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 
125 Idaho 139, 142, 868 P.2d 467, 470 (1993); see Bingham Memorial Hospital v. Dept. 
of Health and Welfare, 112 Idaho 1094, 1096, 739 P.2d 393,395 (1987); see Sate v. 
Mills, 128 Idaho 426,429,913 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (App 1996). 
"Should is not a recommendary suggestion; "approximately" is not meant to 
allow going 17% beyond the required procedure, especially when we are relying on a 
sensitive, perishable solution to generate a quantitative analysis. 
Beginning with the defmition of "may", we fmd Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth 
Edition, to identify the following meanings: 
MAY: To be a possibility, Loosely, is required to; shall; must. In dozens of cases, courts 
have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, in an effort to effect legislative intent. 
p. 1000. 
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Proceeding to the definition of "must" and "should", we find even in the earlier 
version of Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, to identify the following meanings: 
MUST: This word, like the word "shall", is primarily of mandatory effect; and in the sense 
that it is used in antithesis to "may", But this meaning of the word is not the only one, and it 
is often used in a merely sense. p. 1171. 
SHOULD: The past tense of shall, ordinarily implying dufy or obligation; Although usually 
no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby 
distinguishing it from "ought", not normally synonymous with "may". p. 1549. 
We find the definition of"approximate" has been around ahnost forever, and is well 
described in the New Twentieth Century Dictionary, as follows: 
APPROXIMATE: To come near, to approach; to be meant to come near toot to approach, 
but certainly not to be away from or beyond. 
The word, "Approximately" though it may not be defmed in the context of the 
Operator's Manual of the futox machine, is certainly subject to what has long been defmed 
by the New Twentieth Century Dictionary, to mean: "used in the sense of an estimate, 
meaning more or less, but about and near the amount, quantity, or distance specified." 
(Emphasis added). 
Clearly, "should" is the past tense of "shall", and "shall" must be recognized, even 
by the Hearing Officer, to be of a mandatory effect. The rule of lenity requires the strict 
construction of an administrative rule when applied in a property right context, and 
especially where a property right, protected by the Constitution and protected by the 
substantive and procedural due process rights under the Due Process clause of a constitution, 
would expect procedural compliance strictly applied in this testing process. The word 
"approximately" is not the word you would use to allow a state of being that would be 17% 
out of compliance, and as construed, should not be allowed to be outside 1 %, and the test 
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solution should be required to be changed before 100, between 99 and 101, but not more 
than that. 
The Standard Operating Procedure for the operation of the Intox 5000 has been cited 
in In Re Mahurin, supra, for further specific reference and Judicial Notice. 
Clearly, 99 to 10 I is more or less, and is about and near the amount, and as such, 
may arguably be within the range of lenity for being approximate to the number 100, but no 
stretch of lenity would allow you to go out of compliance for a distance of 17% of the range, 
when the acceptable range of I 00 is what was declared in the manual to be a reliable 
solution margin in the required procedure of a reliable test. 
This Solution had been used 1 I 6 times, before Appellant arrived at the Intoxilizer 
Room, and it was already out of compliance before they began his analysis to produce 
number I I 7 (Ad. R., p. 2, Exhibit 2). Consequently, the Lot Solution was out of calibration 
under the required procedural operation of the machine, and must be found to have been out 
of service, and should not have been relied upon in this hearing for any accuracy, and to 
then attempt to use that test result, which itself is unreliable by definition, to then give some 
level of reliability to a non-compliant test, to fmd a logical means to rule over the disputed 
basis for the stop, or the assumed presence of a "reasonable articulable suspicion" serves 
only to add a layer of incompetent evidence to support the lack of any admissible factual 
basis to support for the stop. The suspension order should be set aside and vacated as a result 
of this violation of Idaho Code, § 18-8004 A(7)( d). 
ISSUE V. 
WHETHER APPELLANT-PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
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When administrative findings are made without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and 
violate constitutional or statutory provisions, or in excess of authority, or were made upon 
unlawful procedure, or were clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious, attorney fees and 
costs are awarded pursuant to § 12-117, Idaho Code. See Roeder Holdings, L.L.C. v. Ada 
County, 136 Idaho 809, 41 P.3d237 (2001). 
§ 12-117, Idaho Code, provides for attorney fees to a person, in any administrative 
or civil judicial proceeding, involving adverse parties with a state agency, a city, a county or 
other taxing district. That statute allows award ofreasonable attorney fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses to the party, if the Court fmds in favor of the person, and fmds the 
agency, city or county acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Appellant would respectfully claim a right to recover such fees and costs incurred in 
this appeal, as the Order of suspension, was pursued and granted without a basis in law, or 
fact, contrary to admissible evidence, and in violation of the Rules of Lenity and the 
required operating procedures established by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement 
9IDLE) and the Order of Suspension should be reversed, as there existed no basis to support 
the entry of an order. 
CONCLUSION 
The fmal order of this Hearing Officer is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion, which has resulted in suspending the license of Appellant, and for the reasons 
stated herein, constitutes reversible error, and the Order must be vacated. The Order was 
made upon an unlawful procedure, unsupported by fact and contrary to current Statute, 
Administrative Rules, and Idaho law, and must be set aside and reversed, and the matter 
remanded to the State agency for entry of an order reinstating Appellant's driving privileges, 
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and rescinding the order of suspension. The seizure and proposed suspension in the notice 
of suspension should not have been sustained, as no substantial evidence supports such 
order of suspension. This Court should enter an order for an award of attorney fees and 
costs to Appellant as provided for under the statutes and laws of the State of Idaho, 
specifically provided for in § 12-117, Idaho Code. 
Dated this 25th day of March, 2009. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Appellant 
. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 25th day of March 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the 
following addresses as follows: 
Michael J. Kane 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 
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